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The Rome Statute: Global Justice and the 
Asymmetries of Recognition 
HANS LINDAHL* 
ABSTRACT 
Given the emergence of challenges that are increasingly global in 
nature, and given the irreducible contingency of state borders, it would 
seem that justice must become global justice: justice that takes shape 
through a legal order that holds for all of humanity and everywhere. But 
is justice for all and everywhere possible? At issue, in this question, is not 
a rearguard defense of the state and state law. Instead, the question 
concerns the globality of global law and global justice. Is any legal order 
possible, global or otherwise, that organizes itself as an inside without an 
outside, that is, which is all-inclusive? A prima facie candidate for such 
an order is the Rome Statute, which established the International 
Criminal Court to investigate and prosecute genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Yet careful 
consideration of the scope of the Rome Statute shows that it cannot 
realize global justice as criminal justice without excluding other forms of 
justice, for example restorative justice, thereby both recognizing and 
misrecognizing the victims of the crimes the International Criminal 
Court is called on to investigate and prosecute. Humanity is inside and 
outside the Rome Statute’s invocation of ‘the international community as 
a whole.’ Because it organizes itself as an inside vis-à-vis an outside, the 
Rome Statute, like all global law and justice, is local law and justice. If, 
as this article argues, the inside/outside contrast is constitutive for any 
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imaginable legal order, it also draws on the asymmetries of processes of 
collective recognition to articulate a concept of global justice that is 
neither universalist nor particularist, neither all-encompassing nor 
relativistic.  
 INTRODUCTION 
Whatever else it might mean, the expression “global law” connotes a 
legal order that claims, or aspires to claim, global validity for itself. And 
assuming that a claim to validity entails the aspiration to realizing 
justice, global legal orders are oriented to bringing about global justice, 
even if they forever fall short of the mark in this endeavor. In turn, if 
justice amounts to “rendering to each their own”—suum cuique tribuere, 
in Ulpian’s memorable formulation—or, in another hoary formulation, 
to “treat the equal equally and the unequal unequally,” then global legal 
orders aspire to realize this injunction across the whole face of the 
earth. It would seem that global justice is justice for all, justice era 
omnes, and justice everywhere, justice erga loci, as one might put it. By 
dint of being justice for all and everywhere on earth, global justice 
seems to break with the two key limitations of justice available to state 
law, the validity of which is, in principle, territorially circumscribed. 
States aspire primarily, if not solely, to realize justice for those 
individuals and groups located in their territory, that is, to those who 
are somewhere rather than everywhere. As the champions of global 
justice insistently point out, the contingent borders of states 
continuously undercut the possibility of realizing justice beyond states.1 
For why should justice be limited to those inside a territory and 
withheld from those outside? Why should the contingent fact that I am a 
citizen of state X render me entitled to demand from the state legal 
order that I be rendered what is my own, in contrast to noncitizens who 
may be affected by the actions of the state, yet are located outside of its 
territory? A similar question arises if one looks at the second of the 
aforementioned formulations of the principle of justice. Can it be the 
expression of justice to treat citizens as equals and noncitizens as 
unequal, in light of the more fundamental equality afforded by our 
common humanity? 
Given the irreducible contingency of state borders and the 
emergence of challenges that are global in nature, it would seem that 
justice must become global justice: justice that is unlimited by dint of 
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holding for all and everywhere. And, on the face of it, the emergence of 
global legal orders is a precondition for the possibility of realizing global 
justice, even if a range of emergent global legal orders, such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), fall well short of realizing justice. 
Only a legal order that has an inside but no outside, which would 
include without excluding, can be truly and properly just. This is 
another way of saying that the aspiration to realize an all-inclusive 
legal order is what global justice is about. 
But is justice for all and everywhere possible? By raising this 
question, I am not clearing the ground for a rearguard defense of the 
state and state law, even though there are excellent reasons to believe 
that the state will remain a key—probably the principal—form of 
political organization in a global era. Instead, my question concerns the 
globality of global law and global justice. More specifically, my question 
is twofold. Is any legal order possible, global or otherwise, that does not 
organize itself as an inside vis-à-vis an outside? If, as I will argue, the 
inside/outside contrast is constitutive for any imaginable legal order, in 
what sense can we still hold on to the notion of global justice? 
I. BORDERS AND LIMITS 
Both universalist and particularist readings of justice share a 
common assumption, however bitterly they may disagree on just about 
everything else. Whether one endorses global justice as justice for all 
and everywhere, or justice for those within a territorially bounded 
political collective, one takes for granted that the inside/outside 
distinction is equivalent to the distinction between the domestic and the 
foreign. For example, and trivially, citizens, as well as policy makers 
and other officials, are accustomed to refer to the internal and external 
affairs of states. In the same vein, the legal doctrine refers to territorial 
and extraterritorial jurisdiction, where the latter concerns those 
relatively exceptional situations in which jurisdiction is exercised 
outside of a state’s territory. The defenders of global justice will point 
out that globalization processes signal the crisis of the territoriality 
principle—that we have now entered an era of “justice beyond borders,” 
and hence an era in which it can no longer be taken for granted that the 
distinction between inside and outside is a necessary precondition for 
justice.2 The defenders of state justice, to the contrary, will argue that: 
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[t]he idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded 
world within which distribution takes place: a group of 
people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing 
social goods, first of all among themselves. That world . . 
. is the political community . . . .3 
The universalist denies that the borders of a state condition the 
possibility of justice; the particularist affirms that they do. But whether 
they rue or laud territorial borders, both positions take for granted and 
entrench the assumption that the inside/outside distinction arises with 
the spatial closure that gives rise to the contrast between the domestic 
and the foreign. 
There is, however, a second manifestation of the inside/outside 
distinction that escapes the purview of both theories of justice: the 
distinction between own and strange places. This distinction is more 
fundamental than the distinction between the domestic and the foreign, 
as it is common to both state law and global law. To show why, let me 
begin with state law, evoking Michel Foucault’s discussion of what he 
calls “heterotopias.”4 In contrast to utopias, which connote a society that 
is perfect, hence nowhere, a heterotopia is: 
a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real 
sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the 
culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and 
inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, 
even though it may be possible to indicate their location 
in reality.5 
Foucault subsequently offers a taxonomy of heterotopias, secerning 
“heterotopias of crisis” and “heterotopias of deviation.”6 The former 
relate to places that mark the passage from one phase in life to another, 
such as the honeymoon hotel; the latter refer to places for deviant forms 
of behavior, such as the psychiatric hospital or the prison.7 From a legal 
point of view, a prison is indeed a place for deviant behavior. But it is 
the deviancy proper to criminal behavior, hence to illegality. While a 
prison may be a heterotopia, an “other” legal place, it is not, of itself, a 
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strange place. To the contrary, state legal orders anticipate the 
possibility of criminal behavior and allot it a place within the 
arrangement of legal places that constitutes a territory in the form of 
prisons. Criminal justice is a particular instance of the general 
injunction of assigning to each their own place (i.e., imprisonment). 
Again, criminal justice, like all forms of justice, demands treating the 
equal equally and the unequal unequally, assigning different places to 
the criminal and the innocent. 
Yet, the Marion Federal Penitentiary in Illinois became a strange 
place—a xenotopia, as I will call it—in the course of work stoppages in 
1972 by the Political Prisoners Liberation Front (PPLF) to “challenge 
the very logic of incarceration as a form of permanent living death.”8 
Inmates who normally worked in the metal furniture plant, print plant, 
kitchen, and hospital stayed in their cells. The work stoppages were 
part of a broader and concerted set of actions between the inmates, and 
between them and sympathizers in the outside world, that included 
“radical educational projects, the work of writ writers, clandestine self-
defense classes and organized strikes,” together with legal action and 
political mobilization of the public, both national and international.9 
Resistance by the inmates “challenged the technologies of control and 
coercion [deployed by Marion] and constituted political struggles against 
the logic and function of incarceration as a means to destroy the civil 
and political lives of America’s subordinated populations.”10 Spatially 
speaking, their resistance endeavored to create a new web of 
interconnected places, a new world alternative to the web of 
interconnected places to which the Marion Federal Penitentiary 
belonged. In this way, the “prison rebellion years,” as they came to be 
called, highlight one of the main findings of Lisa Guenther’s critical 
phenomenology of solitary confinement, as brilliant as it is devastating, 
about the relationality of lived space that is rooted in human beings 
“intercorporeality.”11 
It is not difficult to multiply the examples; it may suffice to refer to 
Zuccotti Park in Manhattan, which became xenotopic when taken over 
by the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2006, or the Movimiento de 
Trabajadores Desocupados or Unemployed Workers Movement (MTD), 
                                                                                                     
 8. Alan Eladio Gómez, Resisting Living Death at Marion Federal Penitentiary, 1972, 
96 RADICAL HIST. REV. 58, 58 (2006). 
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 10. Id. 
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which emerged in the wake of the financial crisis that buffeted 
Argentina in 2001 and blocked roads leading to poor neighborhoods at 
the outskirts of cities (piquetes). Participants “talk about the piquete as 
not only being a space of protest, but of what opens up when the road is 
shut down. Movement participants sometimes refer to this as ‘free 
territory.’”12 Indeed, the flip side of moving to block roads of access to 
the neighborhoods was to create “autonomous areas upon which [the 
piqueteros] have built housing and gardens, raised livestock, created 
alternative education and healthcare, among many other subsistence 
projects.”13 
These examples allow me to clarify how I propose to disambiguate 
the distinction between inside and outside. In each case, a form of 
behavior registers in the corresponding state legal order as either legal 
or illegal, hence as emplaced or misplaced. All three forms of behavior 
are inside a legal order, in the sense that they literally take place within 
what, from the perspective of the corresponding state collective, counts 
as our own territory. Their behavior is illegal, that is, misplaced. Yet, 
the behavior of the prison strikers and of the Occupy and MTD 
movements is also outside these state territories: it intimates a way of 
organizing the territory of a collective that calls into question how the 
state posits (il)legality, hence (mis)placement. Their behavior is not only 
emplaced or misplaced; it is also displaced, evoking another distribution 
of ought-places, meaning by such a different arrangement of places in 
which behavior is commanded, prohibited, or allowed. More precisely, it 
speaks to a strange distribution of ought-places, that is, to a distribution 
of places that conflicts with and resists integration into how a given 
state differentiates and joins together a manifold of ought-places into a 
single territory. Their behavior is not just legal or illegal; it is a-legal, 
where the “a” of a-legality refers to a way of distinguishing between 
legal and illegal behavior that contests how this distinction is drawn by 
a given legal order.14 
In short, a-legal behavior speaks to another spatial configuration of 
justice, another way of establishing what counts, in the law, as to each 
their own . . . place. The PPLF, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and 
the piqueteros all assert that justice is not to be found here, in the 
territory of the respective states. Justice is somewhere, yes, but 
somewhere else. They claim that realizing justice requires transgressing 
the boundaries of these ought-places and striving to configure a 
territory otherwise as another interconnected distribution of ought-
places. By transgressing the boundaries of the prison, the square, and 
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 13. Id. 
 14. See HANS LINDAHL, FAULT LINES OF GLOBALIZATION 30–31 (2013). 
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the neighborhood, the protestors attempt to leave the extant territorial 
configurations of their respective states, even though they do not seek to 
cross the border leading into a foreign country.  
Allow me to summarize this highly abridged distinction between two 
senses of the inside/outside distinction in the following way: whereas 
borders speak to the distinction between the domestic and the foreign, 
limits refer to the distinction between own and strange places. Whereas 
only borders partition space into the domestic and the foreign, all 
spatial boundaries of legal orders can appear as limits between own and 
strange places. In effect, the spatial boundaries of the prison, the 
square, and the neighborhood are by no means the borders that 
separate the United States from Mexico or Canada, or Argentina from 
Chile, or Uruguay from Brazil. But, when transgressed by a-legal 
behavior, they appear as a limit that joins and separates what counts as 
a state collective’s own place and a strange place. A further and crucial 
implication follows from this distinction. Indeed, the two forms of the 
inside/outside distinction are irreducible to each other: if the foreign 
need not be strange, so also the strange need not be foreign. 
Paul Schiff Berman holds, in his analysis of what he calls 
“sovereigntist territorialism,” that “we must look elsewhere for a more 
capacious, fluid conception of law beyond borders.”15 It may be the case 
that spatial closure in the form of bordered territories is a historically 
determinate and contingent feature of legal orders. In fact, we already 
are witness to emergent global legal orders, such as the WTO, which are 
not spatially organized in terms of the distinction between the domestic 
and the foreign, even though it relies on Member States. So, yes, legal 
theory, if it is to account for the emergence of global legal orders, must 
shake itself loose from what has been called methodological 
nationalism, developing a more comprehensive model of law that 
incorporates the possibility of law beyond borders. But would this more 
capacious concept of law also be a law beyond limits? Is any global legal 
order imaginable that does not close itself into an inside vis-à-vis a 
strange outside? Might the closure into an inside vis-à-vis an outside be 
a constitutive, rather than contingent, feature of any possible global 
legal orders? Hence, might the price to be paid for these orders’ claims 
to global validity is their continued exposure to the transgression of 
their boundaries by xenotopic behavior which claims that justice is not 
here, in the global legal order, but elsewhere? 
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II. THE ROME STATUTE: GLOBAL JUSTICE AS CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
It would not be difficult to show, when looking at global legal orders, 
that the WTO, for example, emerges by way of a spatial closure into an 
inside vis-à-vis an outside; in the process of giving rise to a global 
market, the WTO marginalizes forms of exchange which resist 
commodification. This marginalization has and continues to spark 
contestation by a range of alter-globalization movements. Most 
prominently perhaps, Seattle briefly became a xenotopia during the 
protests against the WTO Ministerial Conference of 1999.16 Also, and 
regularly, a range of places throughout the world become xenotopic in 
the course of resistance against the WTO by the Via Campesina, the 
International Peasant’s Movement, which brings together over 200 
million peasants and 182 organizations from eighty-one countries 
around the world.17 For example, the motto of the Via Campesina, 
“Globalizing Hope, Globalizing the Struggle,” calls for a counter-
globalization that “promote[s] social justice and dignity and strongly 
opposes corporate driven agriculture that destroys social relations and 
nature.”18 
But while the WTO provides a relatively easy example to validate 
the conjecture that the distinction between own and strange places is an 
ingredient feature of all emergent global legal orders, we do well to 
examine the emergence of legal orders that, on some accounts, aspire 
not only to global but to universal validity, that is, a claim to validity 
that cannot but hold indisputably and without exception for all of 
humanity, everywhere on earth. When someone asserts that a legal 
order is universal, she or he effectively holds that whoever resists that 
assertion challenges our common humanity. Such a challenge, by 
implication, must be dismissed as either specious or in bad faith 
because those who raise it deny their own humanity. 
A prima facie candidate for this strong sense of global law is the 
international criminal law regime, in particular the Rome Statute. In 
effect, the Statute, which was adopted on July 17, 1999, and entered 
into force on July 1, 2002, established the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to investigate and prosecute “the most serious crimes of concern to 
                                                                                                     
 16. WE ARE EVERYWHERE: THE IRRESISTIBLE RISE OF GLOBAL ANTI-CAPITALISM 208 
(Notes from Nowhere ed., 2003). 
 17. “WTO Out! Building Sovereignty”: La Via Campesina to Organise Peoples’ Summit 
During WTO’s XI Ministerial Conference in Argentina” LA VIA CAMPESINA (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://viacampesina.org/en/wto-building-alternatives-la-via-campesina-organise-peoples-
summit-wtos-xi-ministerial-conference-argentina/. 
 18. The International Peasant’s Voice, LA VIA CAMPESINA, https://viacampesina.org/en/ 
international-peasants-voice/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). 
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the international community,”19 as its Preamble puts it, namely, 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression.20 Moreover, the final Consideration of the Preamble asserts 
that the parties are “resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the 
enforcement of international justice.”21 This candidate for a universal 
legal order is especially appropriate because it is, on the face of it, the 
inverted image of the Marion Federal Penitentiary. Both cases turn on 
the archetypical legal place, a prison, if law is that kind of normative 
order that is oriented to enforcing certain kinds of behavior of essential 
importance to society. But whereas resistance by the PPLF challenges 
the justice of a penitentiary regime, of solitary confinement in 
particular, and hence contests that justice has been rendered by 
assigning to political prisoners their own place, the Rome Statute claims 
that prison is where those who have committed any of the four crimes 
that fall under its jurisdiction must belong. Surely, one would say, 
prison is where those condemned for these atrocities belong 
unconditionally, regardless of their nationality and regardless of where 
the atrocities took place. Can there be any doubt that putting war 
criminals into prison is to render global justice by assigning to them 
what is indisputably their own place because they have breached our 
common humanity?  
Certainly, the Statute does not enjoy universal validity in a legal 
sense of the term: the treaty was adopted by a vote of 120 to seven, with 
twenty-one states abstaining. The seven states which voted against the 
Statute were the United States, China, Libya, Iraq, Israel, Qatar and 
Yemen.22 But many take for granted that the Preamble to the Rome 
Statute claims universal validity, when it asserts jurisdiction with 
regard to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.”23 I will return at the end of this article to 
reconsider whether the wording of the Preamble actually endorses 
attributing a claim to universality to the Rome Statute. For the time 
being, it certainly is the case that, according to the Preamble, the 
parties which adopt the Rome Statute claim to represent humanity as a 
whole, and that the jurisdiction of the ICC should in due course cover 
the entire face of the earth, even if such is not yet the case. In contrast 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 28544 (corrected by process-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 
November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001, and 16 January 2002). 
 20. See id. art. 5. 
 21. See id. pmbl. 
 22. Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal 
Court, INSIGHTS, Aug. 11, 1998. 
 23. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 19 (emphasis 
added).  
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to the WTO, it is then a quick step to conclude that the Rome Statute 
inaugurates a global legal order that aspires to an inside without an 
outside. On the face of it, or so the international criminal law movement 
asserts, the Rome Statute is an emergent global legal order that not 
only has no borders but also no limits, by dint of aspiring to be valid for 
all rather than for only part of humanity, and to be valid everywhere 
rather than somewhere. In short, the Rome Statute seems to illustrate 
the possibility of “law beyond limits.” Extending my riff to Caney’s 
“justice beyond borders,” the Rome Statute also seems to illustrate the 
possibility of global justice in the strong sense of the term: justice 
beyond limits. 
The concrete operation of the Rome Statute suggests otherwise, 
however. I do not have in mind the troubling fact that only Africans 
have been prosecuted by the ICC, 
[a] decision [that] has been a function of international 
power relations which make Africa the only region weak 
enough so that Western intervention and 
experimentation can take place there without 
accountability, and unimportant enough so that the 
West will allow the ICC to act as its sub-contractor there 
in place of more direct forms of intervention.24 
Nor, continuing with Branch, do I want to focus on the fact that the 
ICC has also “accommodated itself to political power within Africa,” as 
is “very clear in Uganda, where the ICC eagerly became an instrument 
of the Ugandan government’s counterinsurgency so as to ensure 
Uganda’s cooperation with its prosecution of the LRA [Lord’s 
Revolutionary Army].”25 While both critiques are compelling, neither is 
sufficient to call into question the claim to universality some have 
raised on behalf of the Rome Statute. Indeed, the champion of this claim 
could turn the critiques on their head, arguing that they hit home 
because universality works as the criterion of global justice that allows 
critiquing the concrete operation of the ICC. What would be required, 
the international criminal law movement has argued, is to extend the 
jurisdiction of the ICC to all countries in the world and to grant it 
powers of enforcement to ensure that the four envisaged crimes do not 
                                                                                                     
 24. Adam Branch, What the ICC Review Conference Can’t Fix, OTJR BLOG (Mar.15, 
2010), https://oxfordtransitionaljustice.wordpress.com/2011/10/10/what-the-icc-review-con 
ference-can%e2%80%99t-fix/. 
 25. Id.; see also Adam Branch, Neither Liberal nor Peaceful? Practices of ‘Global 
Justice’ by the ICC, in A LIBERAL PEACE? 121–37 (Susanna Campbell, David Chandler & 
Meera Shabaratnam eds., 2011). 
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go unpunished anywhere in the world—including the seven states 
which voted against the Statute.26 For the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court and likeminded individuals and groups, 
the concrete operation of the ICC exposes its de facto deficiencies, not 
the Statute’s de jure claim to universal validity. Yet rather than the 
vicissitudes tainting the de facto operation of the ICC, what interests 
me is to probe the de jure claim to universal validity attributed to the 
Statute. 
The particular case I have in mind is the ICC’s assertion of 
jurisdiction to investigate and punish members of the LRA for the 
atrocities perpetrated against the Acholi community in Northern 
Uganda, to which many members of the LRA belonged.27 What is of 
paramount importance for my purposes is the response of the Acholi, 
qua victims of these atrocities, to ICC jurisdiction, rather than that the 
ICC allowed itself to be manipulated by the Ugandan government, as 
pointed out by Branch and others. For acting on behalf of their 
community, a group of Acholi Elders travelled to The Hague, the seat of 
the ICC, to oppose its assertion of jurisdiction to investigate and punish 
crimes perpetrated by the LRA.28 The Acholi argued that “[t]he court 
system is justice through punishment. The offender and offended are 
put aside. This leads to polarization which will lead to death.”29 Taking 
issue with the Prosecutor’s move to frame the atrocities as the subject 
matter of international criminal justice, the Acholi called for applying 
restorative justice to those leaders of the LRA who were members of the 
Acholi community. In the words of a member of the Acholi community, 
“in traditional Acholi culture, justice is done for ber bedo, to restore 
harmonious life.”30 This involves creating trust in the parties involved in 
                                                                                                     
 26. See, for example, the position of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 
which asserts that:  
[t]he International Criminal Court must continue to evolve into the global court the world 
demands of it. We work to ensure that the ICC develops as a fair, effective and 
independent Court that sets global justice standards, remains free from political 
interference, and delivers meaningful justice to victims on all sides of conflicts throughout 
the world. 
A Strong ICC, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/fight 
/strong-international-criminal-court (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). 
 27. I explore this case from the perspective of the possibilities and limitations of the 
principle of complementarity in my forthcoming monograph. HANS LINDAHL, AUTHORITY 
AND THE GLOBALISATION OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION (forthcoming 2018).  
 28. Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Monopolizing Global Justice: 
International Criminal Law as Challenge to Human Diversity, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 157, 
165–66 (2015). 
 29. Id. (citation omitted). 
 30. LIU INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL ISSUES, GULU DISTRICT NGO FORUM & KER KWARO 
ACHOLI, ROCO WAT I ACOLI: RESTORING RELATIONSHIPS IN ACHOLI-LAND 14 (2005), 
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mediation, having the voluntary willingness of the perpetrator to 
confess, establishing the facts of a particular conflict, compensating for 
the damage that has been done, and undergoing the celebration of 
rituals oriented to restoring social harmony in the community.31 
The ICC dismissed the Acholi Elders’ plea, holding that their plea 
was a traditional and local form of justice that did not meet the 
international standards required to properly challenge the Court’s 
admission of the case. As Nouwen and Werner perceptively note,  
[c]ontrasted with the ICC’s ‘global justice’, other 
conceptions of justice all of a sudden appear as 
particular, local and traditional. Such traditions are 
accepted as forms of justice in addition to international 
criminal law. But as alternatives to international 
criminal justice they are accepted only if they live up to 
the apparently ‘de-localized’, ‘modern’ and most of all 
‘higher’ standards of ‘global justice’ applied by the ICC.32 
Certainly, the principle of complementarity would have allowed the 
ICC to leave the investigation and punishment of the LRA to Uganda. 
According to this principle, which amounts to a specification of the 
principle of subsidiarity, the ICC can only investigate and prosecute if a 
“State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution,” or if the decision by a state that has jurisdiction not to 
prosecute the respective person results “from the unwillingness or 
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.”33 But, regardless of the 
political motivations brought into play by the Prosecutor of the ICC, 
Luis Moreno Ocampo, and by the Ugandan government, the principle of 
complementarity has its limitations: it “creates space for an alternative 
forum of criminal justice to that of the ICC, but not to an alternative 
conception of justice: for the purposes of complementarity, the domestic 
justice would have to be criminal justice.”34 In short, “the 
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 34. Nouwen & Werner, supra note 28, at 174 (emphasis added). 
 THE ROME STATUTE 683 
institutionalization of global justice through international criminal 
tribunals potentially marginalizes alternative conceptions of justice.”35 
Mark Drumbl points out that it is not necessarily the case that 
“restorative initiatives by definition are always salutary.”36 In 
particular, he avers, “restorative modalities that draw parallels from 
mechanisms used to reintegrate ordinary deviant transgressors in 
settled times will likely run afoul of the complexities of reintegration in 
situations of mass atrocity.”37 But this is a judgment that needs to be 
made contextually; moreover, who gets to make the judgment? Most 
importantly, Acholi’s resistance to the ICC’s assertion of jurisdiction 
reveals that the Rome Statute represents global justice—that is, what 
we, humanity, take to be justice—as punishment, rather than as 
restoration. While a certain accommodation between the two 
conceptions of justice is possible, they respond to two very different—in 
some ways incompatible—understandings of the wrong that has been 
done and of how it should be redressed.  
This is by no means an argument against international criminal 
law. What I want to argue is that claiming universal validity for the 
Rome Statute amounts to collapsing global justice into criminal justice, 
equating how the Statute draws the distinction between legality and 
illegality with the distinction between justice and injustice. When 
exercising its jurisdiction, the ICC holds that criminal justice must 
trump restorative justice because the latter is traditional and local, 
whereas the former is modern and universal; as a result, the ICC 
excludes humanity from global justice in the very process of including it 
through criminal justice. Inclusion and exclusion should be understood 
literally here, for Acholi land is not simply one place in the concinnity of 
interconnected places that make up the ICC’s jurisdiction. What defines 
their land as an ought-place for the Acholi does not simply coincide with 
what determines it as an ought-place for the Rome Statute and the ICC. 
When the Elders travelled to make their depositions to the ICC, Acholi 
land became xenotopic vis-à-vis the court and its criminal jurisdiction. 
Bluntly, the justice rendered by the ICC, when applying the Rome 
Statute, is no less traditional and no less local than the forms of justice 
it subordinates to punishment when invoking the modern and the 
universal. It is no less traditional, because, like restorative justice for 
the Acholi, international criminal law is informed by a concrete, 
historically specific interpretation of human beings and the society in 
which they live. It is no less local, because, by representing global 
justice as criminal justice, the Rome Statute brings about a spatial 
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closure, a certain way of interpreting ought-places that constitutes this 
global legal order as an inside vis-à-vis a strange outside. To dispense 
global justice in the form of criminal justice is to say the law—
jurisdictio—from somewhere, rather than from everywhere. This also 
holds for the Acholi, of course, when they dispense justice in the form of 
restorative justice. Global law can only be law if it involves inclusion 
and exclusion, that is, if it is local law.38 
III. REPRESENTATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF (GLOBAL) LEGAL ORDERS 
The analysis of Acholi resistance to the jurisdiction of the ICC 
supports the conjecture, advanced at the end of Section I, that a spatial 
closure, in the form of the contrast between own and strange places, is 
constitutive for all legal orders, global or otherwise. Before turning to 
explore the implications of this finding for global justice, we first need to 
provide it with a conceptual grounding if the finding is to be more than 
just a conjecture. Such is the task of this Section. I will defend the thesis 
that the key to its conceptual grounding lies in the problem of 
representation. The idea, in abridged form, is the following: because 
collective unity is always a represented unity, and because 
representation always involves inclusion and exclusion, there can be no 
representation of the international community as a whole, other than by 
excluding humanity in the very process of including it. Let me now offer 
a conceptual justification of this thesis. 
The Preamble to the Rome Statute reads as follows: “The States 
Parties to this Statute . . . have agreed as follows.”39 Although 
formulated in a declarative mode, the Preamble is prescriptive in 
character, spelling out the obligations the parties take upon themselves 
in the interests of the international community. Notice, furthermore, 
that the Rome Statute only works as an international treaty if, 
regardless of the third-person formulation employed by the Preamble, it 
is enacted in the first-person plural: “We the States Parties to this 
Statute . . . have agreed as follows.” Moreover, teasing out the specific 
nature of the first-person plural perspective taken up by the parties to 
the Statute, the Preamble implicitly asserts that “We . . . have jointly 
agreed as follows.” Indeed, the Rome Statute marks the emergence of a 
collective subject the members of which commit to acting together as a 
group with a view to realizing the point of their collective action, 
                                                                                                     
 38. My thesis is not that the Rome Statute is a form of “glocal” law, which would imply 
that it conjoins the global and the local; it is that all forms of law are local law, that the 
expression is pleonastic. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 
19. 
 39. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 19, pmbl. 
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namely, contributing to global justice by ensuring that the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole do not go 
unpunished. To borrow Margaret Gilbert’s useful distinction, collective 
action involves an integrative use of the pronoun “we”: “we together” in 
contrast to an aggregative use of “we each.”40 This integrative use of the 
pronoun is also at work in the preambles to state constitutions, a 
canonical formulation of which is, of course, to be found in the Preamble 
to the U.S. Constitution: “We the people . . . do ordain . . .”41 Regardless 
of the differences between enacting an international treaty and a state 
constitution, both cases involve the emergence of collective action by 
what Gilbert would call a “plural subject.”42 Significantly, this 
integrative use of the pronoun is also deployed in collective resistance 
by the PPLF, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the MTD.43 
Henceforth, I will use the expressions we* or us* when referring to 
plural subjectivity. 
Crucially, the first-person plural perspective is invoked, explicitly or 
implicitly, when individuals refer to a legal order as their “own,” or 
speak of “our” law, in the same way that the first-person singular 
perspective is invoked when individuals use the adjectives “my” or 
“mine.” This may sound trivial, but remember that I am attempting to 
provide a conceptual grounding for why the distinction between the own 
and the strange might be constitutive for all legal orders, global or 
otherwise. Well, we now have a conceptual justification of the first term 
of these two contrasts: legal orders presuppose the first-person plural 
perspective of a plural subject, and it is from this perspective that a 
domain of what is deemed to be “our own” can be invoked and asserted. 
Moreover, the invocation of a collective domain of “our own” includes the 
invocation of “our own space”: depending on the point of our joint action, 
we will organize space in one way or another, distinguishing and 
interconnecting ought-places as places in which certain kinds of 
behavior ought to take place because they are important and relevant to 
the realization of the point of our joint action. So, for example, the Rome 
Statute prohibits the commission of the four crimes that are the object 
of its jurisdiction in each signatory state, the territories of which are 
distinct from but connected to all others, while also linking this 
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interconnected distribution of ought-places (in the form of prohibition-
places) to the place where the ICC renders justice, that is, a court house, 
and to a prison. Given the point of joint action under the Statute, other 
ways of organizing the space of this legal order may be irrelevant and 
unimportant, for example, the distinction between public and private 
places. 
But we still are at a loss as to why something like a domain of the 
“strange” might also be constitutive for legal orders, as well as why 
plural subjectivity demands a spatial closure into an inside vis-à-vis an 
outside. A first step to explaining strangeness is taken by 
disambiguating we*. Drawing on and modifying a seminal article by 
Bert van Roermund, I propose to parse we* into three positions: we* 
speaker, we* at stake, and we* author.44 
The first of these positions refers to those individuals who speak/act 
on behalf of a collective. We touch here on an absolutely fundamental 
feature of collective action, regardless of whether it is two or two billion 
participants who act together: the unity of a plural subject is always and 
necessarily a represented unity. In other words, a plural subject intends, 
believes, and acts through its participants. Collective acts are acts that 
someone, whether a participant or a third party, imputes or ascribes to 
a collective as being its act (or intention or belief). For example, that 
“We the (American) People” have enacted a constitution that requires 
that a constituent assembly, composed of a number of individuals, seizes 
the initiative to speak on behalf of the American people. In the same 
way, “We the States parties to this Statute have agreed the following,” 
requires that the State Parties seize the initiative to speak on behalf of 
“the international community as a whole,” that is, that it is the 
international community as a whole which intends, believes, and acts 
through the participant states. As a result, the unity implied in we* is 
always and only given indirectly, through its representations. That we* 
are a unity and what we* are a unity is established in the course of acts 
that are deemed to be acts of the collective, that is, acts which are held 
to represent us*. To borrow a handy distinction coined by Nelson 
Goodman, representation is representation of (a collective) and its 
representation as (this or that unity).45 
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So much for the first we* position, namely, we* speaker. The second 
position, we* at stake, concerns the collective for the sake of which 
individuals or groups act as representatives by positing and enforcing 
the law. Those who take up the we* speaker position claim to enact and 
enforce rules—a constitution, a treaty—in the interest of a collective, for 
example, we* the American people or we* the international community. 
As concerns the Rome Statute, and in light of the gravity of the crimes 
envisaged, the Preamble’s reference to the international community 
should be glossed as meaning we* the human community. Indeed, 
according to the first Consideration of the Preamble, “all peoples are 
united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared 
heritage”; the second Consideration refers to the perpetration of 
“unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity”; 
the third asserts that “such grave crimes threaten the peace, security 
and well-being of the world”; finally, the ninth states that the Rome 
Statute is enacted “for the sake of present and future generations.” This 
is not to say, of course, that all of humanity has jointly enacted the 
treaty and established the ICC, for, as we have seen, seven states 
refused to adopt the Statute. In terms of our three we* positions, most, 
but not all, of we* the human community are deemed to have enacted 
the treaty, that is, to have authored it: we* author. In other words, there 
is no identity between the *we at stake and the we* author positions as 
concerns the Rome Statute, but its signing parties aspire to bring about 
this identity by having all states that belong to the international 
community ratify the Statute. 
A second step can now be taken in the direction of explaining why 
the emergence of the first-person plural perspective of a plural subject, 
whether it be a people or the international or even human plural 
subject, also gives rise to the strange, in addition to a collective domain 
of “our own.” As noted earlier, because we* cannot say “we*,” someone 
must seize the initiative to represent a collective, acting without a prior 
authorization to do so by the we* at stake. Moreover, returning to 
Goodman’s formulation, a collective is represented as this unity, 
whereas it could have been represented as that (other) unity. In other 
words, a certain range of individuals is included as committed to jointly 
pursuing x rather than jointly pursuing y or z. Accordingly, the 
representation of collective unity cannot include individuals and/or 
groups in a we* at stake without also excluding from that we*, thereby 
creating the conditions for resistance to the representational claim: “Not 
in our name!” This cry can take on either of two forms. “I/we have been 
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excluded, but want to be included!” Or: “I/we have been included but 
want to be excluded!” While political theorists are particularly attentive 
to exclusion, representation also gives rise to resistance to inclusion, as 
when indigenous peoples contest their inclusion in “We the people do 
hereby ordain . . .” In short, representational acts are always 
contestable, defeasible claims. The contestability of claims to collective 
unity raised by we* speaker entails that no plural subject is ever fully a 
unity, never entirely identical to itself—nor entirely different from its 
others. 
This is why the representational acts at the inception of a legal 
order, global or otherwise, not only give rise to the first-person plural 
perspective of what counts as a domain of our own but also to the 
strange—to a-legality. For the strange, or a-legal, as introduced in 
Section I, manifests itself through forms of behavior that challenge how 
a legal order draws the distinction between legality and illegality, which 
resist how, say, a constitution or an international treaty represents 
what joins us together. These challenges make visible that 
representation cannot include what is important and relevant without 
also excluding what is considered irrelevant and unimportant to our 
collective action. Furthermore, inclusion and exclusion should be 
understood literally: as a spatial closure. As noted earlier, establishing 
what we ought to do together requires carving out a certain space of 
action—an interconnected distribution of ought-places—that establishes 
where certain forms of behavior ought to take place. Behavior is legal or 
illegal depending on whether it takes place where it is commanded, 
permitted, or prohibited. By contrast, strange behavior registers as 
emplaced or misplaced within that order, that is, as legal or illegal, and 
as displaced because it challenges where a certain form of behavior 
ought to take place: a xenotopia. 
A conceptual grounding of why the Rome Statute cannot emerge as 
a global legal order unless it closes itself as an inside vis-à-vis an 
outside can now be offered. In a nutshell, whoever claims to represent 
humanity as a whole by enacting a legal order with global validity 
claims to represent us*, the human community, and determines what 
our collection action ought to be about. By laying down the point of 
collective action under the Rome Statute, the states which are party 
thereto represent humanity in a twofold sense of the term: they impute 
a legal order to humanity (representation of) and they represent 
humanity as oriented to punishing the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole (representation as). In the 
course of representing humanity as this rather than as that, namely, as 
oriented to realizing global justice through punishment rather than 
through restoration, they exclude humanity in the very process of 
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including it, enclosing the globe as that configuration of ought-places 
which is appropriate to criminal justice, while marginalizing places 
germane to restorative justice. Humanity is inside and outside the Rome 
Statute’s invocations of “the international community as a whole” and 
“international justice.” 
IV. LEGAL ORDER AND JUSTICE 
What sense, then, to make of global justice, both as global and as 
justice, if emergent global legal orders are necessarily local in 
character? Concretely, if the Rome Statute renders global justice in the 
form of criminal justice, how could it dispense justice when confronted 
with challenges to its claim that it represents humanity as a whole?  
As a first step, let us examine how legal orders are connected to 
justice, global or otherwise. When introducing the concept of justice, I 
referred to what are perhaps its two best-known formulations: to each 
their own and treat the equal equally and the unequal unequally. Both 
amount to injunctions addressed to an agent, who can act either justly 
or unjustly. Here, then, is an initial foothold: justice is a first-person 
concept. As it concerns the justice of a legal order, it is a first-person 
plural concept. Although it will be in each case an authority that is 
expected to act justly when positing the law, the authority does so on 
behalf of the plural subject it represents. We* posit the law justly or 
unjustly. 
Notice, furthermore, that in both formulations justice implies a 
manifold of elements, in the broadest possible sense of the word, which 
are to be allotted. To each their own involves assigning to an individual 
or group any of a range of elements. The second formulation does so as 
well, when it refers to equality and inequality. In short, justice involves 
an order, which both differentiates and joins together a manifold of 
elements into a whole. This is another way of saying that justice is a 
virtue predicated of a legal order qua order. 
How is it that the law orders behavior by agents who participate in 
collective action? The standard response is, of course, by assigning 
rights, obligations, and the like, whether to individuals or to groups, 
indicating what kind of behavior ought to take place. This response is 
correct as far as it goes. But it is incomplete. To see why, consider Hans 
Kelsen’s distinction between the four “spheres of validity” of legal 
norms: temporal, spatial, material, and subjective.46 Succinctly, a legal 
order orders behavior by establishing who ought to do what, where, and 
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when, where “ought” has, as we have seen, the threefold meaning of 
command, prohibition, and permission. Legal orders are not only 
putative unities of rules, as legal scholars are wont to think. From the 
first-person perspective of agents, legal orders are also putative unities 
that articulate the four normative dimensions of rules. Legal rules offer 
guidelines for agents to orient themselves in space (where), in time 
(when), qua subjects (who), and qua action (what). So, for example, a 
potential client (who) enters a supermarket (where), stuffs some 
groceries into a pannier, then (time) pays for the products (what), and 
walks back out to the street. As this example shows, a legal order qua 
unity of a manifold of rules has its counterpart in the unity of what one 
might call a pragmatic order, that is, an order that structures action as 
an interrelated manifold of places, times, subjects, and act-contents. A 
right or an obligation to act in a certain way is a right or an obligation 
to do something at a certain place, at a certain time, by a certain 
subject. In the course of determining who ought to do what, where, and 
when, a legal order establishes what counts as legal or illegal behavior; 
conversely, (il)legality is fixed in terms of who ought to do what, where, 
and when.47  
Now, if justice is the virtue of a legal order that, qua order, 
articulates what we* hold in common, it follows that justice is never 
only about allotting rights and obligations to legal subjects; it also 
concerns how legal orders differentiate and interconnect places, times, 
subjectivities, and act-contents. “To each their own” amounts to the 
following: to each their own place, to each their own subjectivity, to each 
their own time and to each their own act, in light of what we* 
understand ourselves to hold in common. Likewise, the second of the 
injunctions to act justly amounts to the demand that places, 
subjectivities, act-contents and temporalities be meted out in a way that 
appropriately reflects equality and inequality, that is, in terms of the 
kind of behavior that ought to come about with a view to realize the 
point of joint action. When one challenges a right or obligation as unjust 
because of how the legal order qualifies behavior as (il)legal, one ipso 
facto challenges how that order differentiates and interconnects the 
who, what, where, and when of the case at hand. This is what I called a-
legality: behavior that registers in the legal order as either legal or 
illegal, yet which challenges what we* qualify as (il)legal. Spatially 
speaking, claims that a legal order is unjust entail calling into question 
how it distributes and interconnects places into a unity of legal places 
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through behavior that intimates a domain outside of what we* have 
called our own place: a strange place—a xenotopia. 
It is this connection between legal orders and (spatial) justice, which 
the PPLF calls into question when initiating work stoppage. Alter-
globalization movements, such as the Occupy Wall Street movement 
and the Argentinian piqueteros, also challenge this connection when 
attempting to reclaim a territory from which they have been 
dispossessed, as do the Acholi Elders contest when asserting that 
members of the LRA should participate in restorative rites in Acholi 
land, rather than be tried under the jurisdiction of the ICC. In each 
case, the claim that a legal order is unjust entails the assertion that 
justice is elsewhere, not “here,” where authorities claim to speak the 
law—jurisdictio. In each case the boundaries of legal orders appear as 
its limits, whether or not they are the borders of a state territory. The 
experience of injustice is the experience of the boundaries of a legal 
order, global or otherwise, as a limit beyond which beckons another 
configuration of who ought to do what, where, and when. 
V. JUSTICE AS RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION 
Having clarified the inner connection between legal order and 
justice, and how that link can be contested such that (il)legality ceases 
to coincide with (in)justice, we must now consider how contestation 
takes place and how legal orders respond to it. For, as Ricœur puts it, 
“undoubtedly one must acknowledge that we are first sensitive to 
injustice [rather than to justice]: ‘Unjust!’, ‘What an injustice!’, we cry 
out to ourselves.”48 What is the nature of this cry? A demand for 
recognition of an identity/difference threatened or violated by a legal 
order. My thesis is that (in)justice plays out in the struggles for 
recognition, which arise as a result of the inclusion in and exclusion 
from legal orders wrought by the representation of collective unity. The 
PPLF, the alter-globalization movements, and the Acholi decry the 
injustice that is visited on them, and they do so by calling attention to 
the misrecognition arising from how a given legal order draws the 
boundaries of (il)legality.  
Every legal order must respond, in one way or another, to the 
demands for recognition with which it is confronted, even if only to 
ignore them. And this means that, by responding to demands for 
recognition, every legal collective is confronted with the question about 
its own identity and what differentiates it from other plural subjects: 
Who are we*? What is and ought our joint action to be about? The two 
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highly abstract formulations of justice alluded to earlier acquire a 
concrete content in the dynamic of question and response through which 
a collective responds to demands for recognition by resetting the 
boundaries of who ought to do what, where, and when. In our responses, 
we* attempt to restore the inner connection of (il)legality to (in)justice, 
whether confirming what we* hitherto qualified as (il)legal behavior or 
drawing this distinction differently. This is but a corollary of the thesis 
that justice, as it pertains to legal orders, global or otherwise, is a first-
person plural concept. 
But what might render our responses to demands for recognition 
just or unjust? Is there an independent criterion that could settle the 
question about the (in)justice of legal orders in the face of demands for 
recognition of an identity/difference threatened or violated by a legal 
order? What does it mean to recognize the other as the condition for 
justice? 
For theories of justice of a universal bent, those and only those legal 
orders or institutions are just that allow all those who are subject to a 
legal order to reciprocally recognize each other as free and equal 
beings.49 Whence universalism’s dialectical interpretation of the 
dynamic of question and response proper to justice: an initial situation 
of misrecognition and injustice calls forth a response by us*, whereby, if 
we* act in good faith, we* transform the terms of (il)legality such that 
we* can come to recognize ourselves in the other, and so also the other 
in ourselves. Paraphrasing a terse formulation by Jürgen Habermas, 
recognition of “the other as one of us refers to the flexible ‘we’ of a 
community that resists all substantive determinations and extends its 
permeable boundaries ever further.”50 If a demand for recognition arises 
as the result of unjustified exclusion from we* who are at stake, we* 
ought to respond by including those whom had been excluded, such that 
they can view themselves as members in full standing of our 
community. For theories of reciprocal recognition, all recognition is, 
ultimately, collective self-recognition. Justice as reciprocal recognition 
boils down to the reciprocity of self-recognition in the other: we* 
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recognize ourselves in the other, and the other recognizes herself in us*. 
For universalism, to act justly, in the face of a demand for recognition, is 
to reconstitute our collective unity at a higher level of generality, while 
also allowing for plurality within that unity—e pluribus unum. The 
outcome of this dialectic between collective self and other, if things go 
well, is that we* can again claim, even if only for the time being, to have 
a just legal order which allots to each their own, that is, which treats 
the equal equally and the unequal unequally. Ultimately, to obey the 
injunction to act justly when positing the law is to obey “the injunction 
to complete inclusion.”51 
Global justice, for theories of reciprocal recognition, will be realized 
by a legal order, which includes all of humanity and is thus valid 
everywhere, rather than somewhere: a legal order with an inside but no 
outside. While it may be necessary to postpone its realization 
indefinitely in historical time, global justice as universal justice is in 
principle possible because parties in conflict about who ought to do 
what, where, and when can come to reciprocally recognize each other as 
consociates within a single legal order which treats them as the same, 
namely as free and equal agents, while also recognizing them as 
different. 
VI. THE ASYMMETRIES OF RECOGNITION 
Will the model of (global) justice as reciprocal recognition work? 
This is a massive question, far bigger than what I can either answer or 
justify in the remainder of this article. A more cautious and modest way 
of approaching it is this: does reciprocal recognition really get at how 
global justice might be dispensed in the face of Acholi resistance to the 
ICC’s assertion of jurisdiction for the atrocities committed in their land? 
No, or so I will argue: reciprocal recognition is blind to the double 
asymmetry that characterizes the dynamic of question and response in 
which struggles for recognition play out, and which is particularly 
manifest in the case of Acholi resistance to ICC jurisdiction. With 
theories of reciprocal recognition, I hold that struggles for recognition 
are the focal point of global (in)justice. Against theories of reciprocal 
recognition, I aver that a collective’s recognition of an identity/difference 
it threatens or violates has an asymmetrical structure, which precludes 
interpreting justice as a process of rendering legal orders ever more 
inclusive. Such an all-inclusive order is what Kant would call its 
“regulative idea.” Asymmetrical recognition amounts to drawing the 
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boundaries of (il)legality in a way which recognizes the other (in 
ourselves) as one of us and as other than us. 
A first asymmetry in struggles for recognition concerns the 
anteriority of the question with respect to a collective’s response. By 
such I do not mean a simple chronological priority, such that there first 
has to be a question, in the form of a demand for recognition, before 
there can be a response. Instead, at stake is a normative challenge to 
who we* are that comes too early because it catches us* unprepared and 
at a loss as to how to respond to it. While legal orders create normative 
expectations about behavior, and thereby also anticipate the possibility 
of illegal behavior, what I have called a-legality consists in a form of 
behavior that disorients us* by challenging both terms of the 
legal/illegal distinction. The a-legality of demands for recognition is 
anterior to joint action because it catches a collective by surprise, 
intimating ways of acting and living together that the legal order did 
not anticipate, hence a future that arrives in advance of the future, 
which we had counted on and thereby already rendered present. 
This is exactly what happened with the Acholi: from the first-person 
plural perspective of the “international community as a whole,” as 
represented by the ICC, one would have anticipated that, in light of the 
atrocities committed in Northern Uganda, the Acholi community would 
have welcomed criminal punishment for the LRA, either by the 
Ugandan government or, subsidiarily, by the ICC, if the Ugandan 
government was unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute those 
crimes. Instead, and against these expectations, the Elders demanded 
that the ICC desist from asserting its jurisdiction over Acholi members 
of the LRA, making room for restorative justice rituals in the Acholi 
communities. The Acholi’s resistance is a demand for recognition of an 
identity/difference threatened or violated by the ICC’s exercise of 
criminal justice. Their resistance contests both terms of the contrast 
between legality and illegality by evincing other ways of acting together, 
other practical possibilities of dealing with an atrocity, than those 
contemplated by the Rome Statute. 
A second asymmetry in struggles of recognition turns on the 
retroactivity of the response to what questions or challenges a plural 
subject’s legal order. By this I mean that collectives will frame their 
responses to demands for recognition in such a way that their acts of 
recognition of the other are acts of collective self-recognition. While a 
collective can certainly transform how it draws the distinction between 
the legal and the illegal, demands for recognition will be framed as the 
question, “What is/ought our joint action to be about?” When recognizing 
the other, we* have to be able to continue recognizing ourselves as the 
collective which we* are and want to continue being. The retroactivity of 
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responsiveness consists in framing demands for recognition in a way 
that renders them orderable for the collective in terms of its own 
normative possibilities. As a result, there is always normative 
remainder in the demand for recognition that doesn’t get addressed by 
the collective’s response. 
This is what happened in the case of Acholi resistance, when the 
Elders demanded that criminal justice give way to restorative justice. 
Their demand was waved away, ignored, as a local and traditional 
practice that did not meet the global and modern standards of 
international criminal justice. Assuredly, one could have imagined that 
the ICC would have been able to act otherwise. The ICC might have 
sought to bring pressure to bear on the Ugandan government to 
investigate and prosecute the crimes, or it might have contemplated 
restorative justice as supplementary to its criminal justice. But, as 
Nouwen and Werner pointed out in an earlier citation, the principle of 
complementarity “creates space for an alternative forum of criminal 
justice to that of the ICC, but not to an alternative conception of justice: 
for the purposes of complementarity, the domestic justice would have to 
be criminal justice.” Whether the ICC were to desist from asserting its 
jurisdiction by pushing the Ugandan government to investigate and 
prosecute the atrocities in Acholi lands, or by allowing for restorative 
justice rituals to take place in addition to criminal justice, by qualifying 
and judging the atrocities that took place as a matter of criminal justice, 
the ICC’s response is an act of collective self-recognition by the 
international community which recognizes the other, the Acholi, as one 
of us*, while also misrecognizing the Acholi because they demand to be 
viewed as other than us*. 
The asymmetries at work in struggles for recognition preclude that 
human plurality can or could come to be contained within the unity of 
any given legal order. 
VII. GLOBAL JUSTICE AND RESTRAINED COLLECTIVE SELF-ASSERTION 
Interpreting justice, global or otherwise, in terms of reciprocal 
recognition runs the risk of assimilating the other, who becomes no 
more than one of us*. The counterpart to the injustice of “othering” is 
the injustice of “selving.” Theories of reciprocal recognition take for 
granted that demands for recognition can in principle, even if not 
always in fact, be sorted out within a single legal order by redefining the 
order’s unity in a way which fully accommodates human plurality. In a 
word: justice as reciprocal justice presupposes that a legal order is 
possible in which everyone could be fully emplaced: to each their own 
place. By contrast, justice as asymmetrical recognition acknowledges 
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the irreducible ambiguity of recognition, which is always also 
misrecognition.52 This ambiguity is by no means a call to resignation. 
For asymmetrical recognition is that form of responsiveness to demands 
for recognition in which the other (in ourselves) is recognized as one of 
us* and as other than us*. 
What, concretely, does this mean in the case of the Acholi? And in 
what way might asymmetrical recognition offer a template to 
understand what is at stake in global justice more generally? 
In addressing these urgent questions, I take my cue from Carl 
Schmitt’s notion of the exception (Ausnahme), albeit to give this notion 
an anti-Schmittian twist. In a well-known work, Schmitt takes issue 
with the truism according to which the exception confirms the rule. He 
shows compellingly that the exception, in its proper and strong sense, 
does not confirm the rule because it “cannot be subsumed [in a rule]; [it 
is a form of behavior that] defies the general codification.”53 The 
expression “what cannot be subsumed” is a pallid translation of the 
German original: was sich entzieht, which connotes what defies, eludes, 
and exceeds a rule. The exception is the strange which resists 
accommodation in how a legal order draws the distinction between the 
legal and the illegal; the a-legal. But whereas for Schmitt the irruption 
of an exception into a legal order is a clarion call for an individualized 
measure (Maßnahme) that would destroy the strange with a view to a 
ensuring a collective’s continued existence, I submit that the strange is 
not necessarily the domain of enmity, even though there are forms of 
strangeness which manifest themselves in the guise of the enemy. Most 
fundamentally, the exception resists inclusion because it is the other (in 
ourselves) that is strange to us*. When confronted with an exception, a 
collective can exercise restraint when asserting its continued existence, 
suspending the application of rules that are in principle applicable to 
the case at hand. In this way, a collective engages in an act of indirect 
recognition, a form of recognition that holds back to hold out insofar as 
we* cannot include the other (in ourselves) as one of us without 
destroying the other’s strangeness. To suspend the application of the 
rule, to let the law remain silent rather than to speak it (jurisdictio), is 
to protect the dimension of strangeness in the other that resists 
accommodation in what we* call our own. Asymmetrical recognition 
amounts to restrained collective self-assertion.54 
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I am not pleading, however, either for collective self-assertion tout 
court, in which case recognition is no more than recognition of the other 
(in ourselves) as one of us*, or simply for a collective self-restraint that 
would treat the other (in ourselves) simply as other than us*; 
asymmetrical recognition conjoins collective self-assertion and restraint. 
Why? Because suspending the application of the law to the other as 
strange cannot go so far as to become an act that betrays who we* are as 
a collective. We* must be able to continue asserting what we* deem to 
be our collective identity when suspending the application of our legal 
order to preserve the other as strange. Were we* not able to do so, our 
preservation of the other as strange would amount to a form of collective 
self-betrayal, the denial of who we* are as a collective.  
What, concretely, does restrained collective self-assertion mean for 
the Acholi and other comparable cases of resistance to the Rome 
Statute? Qua restrained collective self-assertion, it means that the ICC 
should have considered the possibility of not asserting its jurisdiction 
over the atrocities perpetrated in Acholi lands. More precisely, it should 
have considered suspending the application of the principle of 
complementarity and making room for the Acholis to settle the 
atrocities through restorative justice. By dismissing straightaway and 
without any serious consideration the Elders’ plea for restorative 
justice, qualifying it as a form of local and traditional justice, the ICC, 
by way of its Prosecutor, committed an injustice, assimilating the other 
to one of us*. Qua restrained collective self-assertion, an assessment of 
whether complementarity should be suspended would have required a 
careful contextual judgment, in dialogue with the Elders and others, 
about whether restorative justice would be able, citing Drumbl anew, to 
deal with the “complexities of reintegration in situations of mass 
atrocity.” To hold back from asserting the ICC’s jurisdiction, if 
restorative justice were incapable or insufficient to deal with these 
complexities, would amount to betraying the Court’s mandate to 
“guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international 
justice,” as per the final Consideration of the Preamble to the Rome 
Statute. 
Against a universalist reading of the Statute that would collapse 
global justice into criminal justice, I interpret the final Consideration of 
the Preamble as implicitly conceding that criminal justice does not 
exhaust international justice, hence that under certain conditions the 
ICC may be called upon to suspend complementarity and the dominion 
of criminal justice to create the conditions for global justice. I am in 
Drumbl’s good company when he argues for “qualified deference” to 
national or local institutions in dealing with mass atrocities: 
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Qualified deference does not involve a blind retreat to national or 
local institutions. Such . . . retreat would be problematic. In some 
postconflict societies, juridical institutions are devastated, illegitimate, 
corrupt, manipulable, complicit in violence, or in the service of 
repressive social control . . . . Complementarity, however, is too 
controlling . . . . Qualified deference . . . creates a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of local or national institutions that, unlike 
complementarity, does not search for procedural compatibility between 
their process and liberal criminal law and, unlike primacy, does not 
explicitly impose liberal criminal procedure.55 
I take Drumbl’s defense of qualified deference to be a particularly 
apposite illustration of asymmetrical recognition as the heart of 
restrained collective self-assertion, regardless of the specific 
interpretative guidelines he proposes for applying the principle of 
qualified deference to cases of mass atrocity. 
More generally, it seems to me that restrained collective self-
assertion offers a template to understand what is at stake in global 
justice. The reader will remember that I began this article by asking 
about the globality of global law and global justice. At first glance, the 
answer is as obvious as it is perspicuous: it speaks to a law and a justice 
which have an inside but no outside; a law and a justice that hold 
unequivocally and unconditionally for all of humankind and 
everywhere. The main thrust of this article has been to show that while 
not all legal orders have borders, all legal orders, global or otherwise, 
have limits, an outside which appears through xenotopic behavior. 
Succinctly, because the representation of the human community 
through a legal order represents humanity as this rather than as that, 
the emergence of a global legal order folds non-identity, a difference, 
into collective identity, giving rise to others—potentially to strange 
others—in ourselves who can contest their inclusion in the legal order 
we* call our common humanity: Not in our name! Because the unity of 
humanity is a represented unity, no legal order can include humanity 
without also excluding it. No legal order can claim global validity for 
itself unless it is somewhere rather than everywhere. Global law is local 
law; so also the Rome Statute. 
But if legal orders aspire to realize justice, does this then mean that 
global justice is perforce local justice? Yes and no. Yes, insofar as global 
legal orders cannot but aspire to render to each their own place within 
the limited arrangement of places to which they give rise. Such is the 
tenor of collective self-assertion. No, insofar as those who claim to 
represent humanity acknowledge, through their self-restraint, that 
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justice is never only to be rendered here, in the borderless but limited 
global legal order we* call our own, but also elsewhere. 
